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STRIKING A BALANCE:  WHEN TO EXTEND 
THE RIGHT TO RESCIND UNDER TILA 
KIMBERLEY AYER†
INTRODUCTION 
 
Before the subprime mortgage market collapsed, a number of 
public figures warned of the oncoming crisis.  In May 2007, 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke gave a speech at 
the Federal Reserve Bank in Chicago on the development of the 
subprime mortgage market since the 1990s.1  In that speech, 
Bernanke laid out the background of the subprime mortgage 
market and the growth of the secondary mortgage market.2  
Almost a year later, Lydia B. Parnes, the Director of the Bureau 
of Consumer Protection at the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”), delivered a prepared statement in which she voiced the 
FTC’s “concern[s] about the rise in delinquencies and foreclosures 
in the subprime market, and the impact on communities . . . [as 
well as the FTC’s] commit[ment] to using all of its tools to protect 
consumers in [that] market.”3
 
† Notes & Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. 
John’s University School of Law; M.A., 2007, University of Connecticut; B.A., 
Gettysburg College, 2005. 
  Parnes went on to enumerate the 
1 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago’s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition: The 
Subprime Mortgage Market (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070517a.htm Bernanke explained that 
the expansion of the subprime mortgage market in the 1990s was “spurred in large 
part by innovations that reduced the costs for lenders of assessing and pricing risks,” 
“technological advances [that] facilitated credit scoring by making it easier for 
lenders to collect and disseminate information on the creditworthiness of prospective 
borrowers,” and  “new techniques [developed by lenders] for using this information 
to determine underwriting standards, set interest rates, and manage their risks.” Id. 
2 See id. (noting that “subprime mortgage lending began to expand in earnest in 
the mid-1990s, the expansion spurred in large part by innovations that reduced the 
costs for lenders of assessing and pricing risks”). 
3 Improving Consumer Protections in Subprime Lending: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Interstate Commerce, Trade & Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 
Sci. & Transp., 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Lydia B. Parnes, Director, 
Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC). 
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FTC’s various mechanisms for protecting consumers in the 
subprime market, including bringing a number of legal actions 
against mortgage institutions and other mortgage industry 
entities,4 educating consumers in how mortgage lending works,5 
and conducting continuing research in order to understand the 
ever-changing mortgage market and develop policies to better 
protect borrowers.6
One of the most powerful tools borrowers have at their 
disposal to protect themselves from unscrupulous lenders is the 
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”).
 
7  Under TILA, borrowers have 
the right to rescind a mortgage transaction for up to three years 
if the lender fails to adhere to the requirements of the Act,8 
including failing to disclose the expiration date of the three-day 
rescission period to which all borrowers are entitled.9  Until 
recently, various circuit courts have employed what is essentially 
a strict liability standard, finding that a relatively minor 
technical violation of TILA entitles a borrower to the extended 
three-year rescission period.10  Recently, however, the First 
Circuit split from tradition and established a new “reasonable 
person” test to determine whether a borrower understood that he 
had three days to rescind his mortgage transaction.  Under this 
test, if an average, reasonable borrower would have understood 
that he had three days to rescind the transaction, then the court 
will not extend the rescission period to three years.11
This Note argues that the reasonable person standard that 
the First Circuit implemented in Melfi v. WMC Mortgage Corp.
   
12
 
4 See id. at 5–12. 
 
to determine whether a consumer has a right to the three-year 
5 See id. at 12–13. 
6 See id. at 13–17. 
7 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667(f) (2006). 
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); infra notes 49–51. 
9 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2010). 
10 See, e.g., Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 704 
(9th Cir. 1986) (finding that even a minor technical violation of the Act such as 
failure to include the expiration date of the rescission period entitled the borrower to 
the extended rescission period); Williamson v. Lafferty, 698 F.2d 767, 768 (5th Cir. 
1983) (holding that “failure properly to complete the right to rescission form 
automatically violates the Act” and that “failure to fill in the expiration date of the 
rescission form is a violation”). 
11 See Melfi v. WMC Mortg. Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 312–13 (1st Cir. 2009) (ruling 
that when “a reasonable borrower cannot have been misled,” it is inappropriate to 
allow the extended rescission period), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1058 (2010). 
12 Id. 
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extended rescission period is not practicable in light of the recent 
subprime mortgage crisis and the predatory practices that 
characterized subprime lending.  Part I.A explains the 
background of the proliferation of subprime mortgages and the 
eventual crisis that they caused in the mortgage market.  
Part I.B contains a brief history of the Truth in Lending Act, as 
well as a more detailed discussion of a consumer’s rescission 
rights under that Act.  Part II.A lays out the methodology that 
various circuit courts have used to determine whether a borrower 
is entitled to the extended rescission period.  Part II.B explains 
how the First Circuit recently departed from this long-used 
methodology by implementing a reasonable person test instead of 
the traditional “strict liability” standard.  Part III argues that 
while the First Circuit was correct to reject the traditional strict 
liability standard, its new reasonable person test fails to take 
into account the realities of predatory lending.  Predatory lenders 
specifically target potential borrowers that they perceive as 
vulnerable—borrowers that they can scare into taking on a 
subprime loan, who are in some way less likely to understand 
fully the transaction.13
When lenders do not include the expiration date of the 
rescission period in the borrower’s paperwork, courts should 
employ a rebuttable presumption that the borrower did not know 
when the rescission period ended and is entitled to the extended 
three-year rescission period.  Such a presumption would uphold 
the purpose of TILA by providing protection for the borrower and 
also would ensure that lenders have an incentive to include the 
expiration date of the rescission period in the borrower’s 
rescission notice.  The burden of proof must be on the lender to 
rebut that presumption by demonstrating that the borrower did 
know when the three-day rescission period expired.  Use of this 
rebuttable presumption would result in two significant benefits.  
First, courts would be able to provide relief to consumers who 
were taken advantage of by predatory lenders during the 
  Because predatory lenders do not target 
the average, reasonable consumer, it is unfair to apply a 
reasonable person standard when determining a consumer’s 
rights. 
 
13 See Joshua M. Stolly, Comment, Subprime Lending: Ohioans Fall Prey to 
Predatory Lending at Record Levels—What Next? 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 289, 294–96 
(2008) (outlining the various groups predatory lenders target because they perceive 
those groups as vulnerable). 
CP_Ayer (Do Not Delete)  7/14/2011  4:10 PM 
264 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:261   
subprime mortgage boom.  Second, courts would not be forced to 
reward consumers who did understand the nature of the 
rescission period but nevertheless are attempting to use a minor 
technical TILA violation as a loophole to get out of a bad 
mortgage. 
I. SUBPRIME MORTGAGES AND TILA 
A. The Rise and Fall of the Subprime Mortgage Market 
Subprime mortgage lending is tailored to those borrowers 
who have less than pristine credit.14  With the rise of subprime 
mortgages in the 1990s, gone were the days in which local banks 
issued mortgages only “to individuals with perfect or near-perfect 
credit” and “held on to the loans and provided all the necessary 
servicing and documentation.”15  At the same time, lending 
institutions began issuing subprime loans with exorbitantly high 
interest rates to individual consumers with poor credit who 
otherwise would not have been able to obtain mortgages.16  
Private banks purchased subprime loans, packaged them as 
“collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) or collateralized mortgage 
obligations (CMOs),” and made them available to mutual funds 
and pension plans for investment.17
 
14 See Solomon Maman, Note, New Tools for Combating Unfair, Deceptive and 
Abusive Mortgage Practices: New Amendments to Regulation Z, 21 LOY. CONSUMER 
L. REV. 194, 199 (2008) (“The term ‘Subprime Lending’ was coined sometime in the 
early 1990s by the securitization industry, Wall Street firms or rating agencies in an 
attempt to distinguish securities backed by mortgages made to borrowers with 
excellent credit from securities backed by mortgages made to borrowers with 
impaired credit.”); see also Jonathan Macey et al., Helping Law Catch up to Markets: 
Applying Broker-Dealer Law to Subprime Mortgages, 34 J. CORP. L. 789, 798–99 
(2009) (defining subprime mortgage lending as “the making of loans to people with 
less than perfect creditworthiness” and emphasizing that “the key point is that 
subprime loans are those to borrowers whose risk profile makes default a more 
realistic possibility than for those made to prime borrowers”). 
  This practice led to an  
 
 
15 Macey et al., supra note 14, at 799. 
16 See Stolly, supra note 13, at 293. The author recounts an instance in which he 
was solicited by an insurance agent to refinance his home, was quoted a nineteen 
percent interest rate, and told that only subprime borrowers paid such an exorbitant 
rate. See id. at 289–90. 
17 Macey et al., supra note 14, at 800; see also Bernanke, supra note 1 (noting 
that “regulatory changes and other developments have permitted lenders to more 
easily sell mortgages to financial intermediaries, who in turn pool mortgages and 
sell the cash flows as structured securities”). 
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“influx of money into the subprime mortgage lending industry,” 
which made mortgages available to a larger number of 
Americans who previously would not have been eligible.18
At first blush, the proliferation of subprime mortgages 
appeared to have a positive impact on American home 
ownership.
 
19  Subprime mortgage lending was seen “in many 
cases . . . [as] a welcome financing tool to those who could not 
otherwise obtain home mortgage financing.”20  Indeed, subprime 
lending principally became known as a way for consumers who 
would typically have been excluded from the mortgage market to 
become homeowners.21
Subprime mortgages were not, however, the boon to high-
risk prospective homeowners that they seemed to be at first.  
Such mortgages came with extremely stringent terms that 
seemed almost to set up the consumer for failure.
 
22  Because 
subprime lenders were taking on “the additional risk correlated 
with low credit scores,”23 lenders charged higher interest rates 
than they would charge for prime loans24 and included 
prepayment penalties in the terms of subprime loans.25
 
18 Macey et al., supra note 14, at 800. 
  
Consumers were hooked into signing on to subprime mortgages 
despite these unfavorable terms because many such mortgages 
19 See id. at 799 (noting that traditional mortgage “terms and the credit 
requirements meant that only middle- and upper-class Americans were able to 
obtain mortgages, making it hard for large segments of the population to own 
homes”). The article goes on to add that these traditional requirements led to a 
disparate impact on racial minorities. See id. 
20 Stolly, supra note 13, at 293. 
21 Maman, supra note 14 (“Subprime lending carved its niche in the consumer 
credit market by providing a source of funds for those borrowers who were 
underserved by commercial banks and thrifts, borrowers with blemished credit 
characteristics, borrowers with low-to-moderate income, and minorities.”). 
22 See Robert Murken, Comment, Can’t Get No Satisfaction? Revising How 
Courts Rescind Home Equity Loans Under the Truth in Lending Act, 77 TEMP. L. 
REV. 457, 462 (2004) (noting that “many subprime loans can create their own risk by 
saddling a borrower of limited means, who was nonetheless able to maintain 
payments on her prior debt load, with a loan she simply cannot afford, which pushes 
her over the edge into default”). 
23 Macey et al., supra note 14, at 801. 
24 See Murken, supra note 22 (stating that subprime mortgages that cross the 
line into predatory lending “include interest rates well above the market 
rate, . . . which typically do not reflect the actual risk of the loan”). 
25 See Macey et al., supra note 14, at 801 (describing a prepayment penalty as “a 
charge to the mortgage holder for paying off a mortgage before the payments are 
due” and noting that such penalties “are present in roughly 80% of subprime loans 
but only 2% of prime loans”). 
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“often feature[d] two-year low ‘teaser’ rates before switching to a 
high floating-interest rate.”26  While the housing market was still 
booming, more savvy consumers were able to avoid the floating-
interest rate by beginning “cycle[s] of refinancing upon the end of 
the two-year ‘teaser’ period.”27
Chairman Bernanke warned of serious problems developing 
in the subprime mortgage market, including a high level of 
delinquencies,
  
28 a corresponding rise in home foreclosures,29 and 
rapidly falling home values.30  Many of these problems were a 
direct result of the widespread practice of extending subprime 
loans to high-risk consumers,31 who were ultimately unable to 
repay their mortgages and defaulted.32
In fact, at the time of Bernanke’s speech, the subprime 
market was already in a tailspin, fueled by increasing corruption 
in the secondary mortgage market.
   
33  One major factor that 
initiated the corruption was the collateralization of subprime 
mortgages; “because the originators and brokers did not hold the 
loans they created, standards and diligence in originating loans 
were compromised.”34
 
26 Id. at 802. 
  Further contributing to the instability in 
the mortgage market was the change in compensation for 
mortgage brokers from a fixed salary to a commission-based  
 
27 Id. 
28 See Bernanke, supra note 1 (stating that “the rate of serious delinquencies—
corresponding to mortgages in foreclosure or with payments ninety days or more 
overdue—rose sharply during 2006 and recently stood at about 11 percent, about 
double the recent low seen in mid-2005”). 
29 See id. (“In the fourth quarter of 2006, about 310,000 foreclosure proceedings 
were initiated, whereas for the preceding two years the quarterly average was 
roughly 230,000. Subprime mortgages accounted for more than half of the 
foreclosures started in the fourth quarter.”). 
30 See id. 
31 See Stolly, supra note 13, at 294 (“Subprime borrowers’ high risks are 
generally caused by delinquencies, charge-offs, judgments, foreclosures, 
bankruptcies, debt-to-income ratios, and low credit scores.”). 
32 See id. at 291 (characterizing subprime lending as “one form of predatory 
lending” and noting that “victims frequently fail to meet their heavily lopsided 
financial obligations and are forced into foreclosure”). 
33 See id. at 294 (noting that although “[t]heoretically, subprime lending is 
completely ethical . . . [it] runs afoul and turns predatory when the lenders use 
illegal and/or unethical tactics to secure the loans, or worse, when they offer 
subprime loans to those who qualify for prime loan treatment”). The author goes on 
to describe typical predatory lending practices. See id. at 294–99. 
34 Macey et al., supra note 15, at 801. 
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salary, which led mortgage brokers to issue increasingly risky 
mortgages to clients who in the past would not have been able to 
get a mortgage, in order to boost their own salaries.35
Finally, lenders engaged in predatory practices, specifically 
targeting consumers based on factors such as race, gender,  
age, and economic status.
 
36  Predatory lenders steered those 
borrowers toward subprime mortgages that the lenders knew 
those consumers could never afford37 or got them involved in 
procedures such as flipping,38 practices that imposed severe 
financial burdens on consumers who were ill-equipped to take on 
such burdens.  Moreover, predatory lenders created “no doc 
loans” and “liar loans,” which allowed consumers to obtain 
mortgages either without including their income information or 
by affirmatively misrepresenting their income.39
 
35 See Macey et al., supra note 14, at 794–95. Macey notes that corruption in the 
subprime lending market only increased with the development of the “yield spread 
premium (“YSP”), a device developed to provide incentives for mortgage brokers” to 
talk consumers into taking on higher-interest mortgages by providing kickbacks to 
the brokers based on the difference between the average interest rate on that day 
and the interest rate attached to the loan the broker talks the unwitting borrower 
into. Id.; see also Stolly, supra note 13, at 304 (“A common example of a kickback is 
when the lender tells the mortgage broker it will lend at a 15% rate, and in turn, the 
broker tells the customer that they will get them a 15.25% rate, and the amount 
above the 15% goes to the broker as a ‘kickback.’ ”). 
  In return for 
the risk of extending credit to such financially unstable  
 
 
 
 
 
36 See Stolly, supra note 13, at 294–96 (noting that predatory lenders 
aggressively target victims based on their low income, race, gender, or age). 
37 See id. at 294–95 (describing the predatory practice of “steering” as “ ‘the 
practice of directing consumers to high rate/high cost loans based simply on their 
race or economic status and their lack of information, rather than based on their 
credit histories or credit risks’ ” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 72 
(2000)). 
38 See Murken, supra note 22 (describing flipping as an “exploitative technique 
some predatory lenders use . . . where the lender will convince an unwitting 
consumer to needlessly refinance a loan, sometimes several times, racking up more 
fees and points each time”). 
39 Stolly, supra note 13, at 297 (describing a “no doc loan” as one “in which 
lenders allow borrowers to state any amount of income they desire while providing 
no proof of employment or income” and a “liar loan” as one where “the income is 
exaggerated to a level that guarantees the approval of the loan”). 
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consumers, lenders issued them subprime mortgages, which 
resulted in higher costs to the consumer40 and which, ultimately, 
many consumers were unable to repay.41
Eventually, the “unprecedented boom of mortgage activity” 
that this country experienced between 2001 and 2006 slowed “as 
rising interest rates and declining house values began affecting 
consumers in the subprime market.”
 
42  The decline in home 
values around this time prevented subprime borrowers from 
refinancing their mortgages, and thus, they could no longer avoid 
having to pay the much higher floating interest rates that kicked 
in after the two-year “teaser” rate had ceased.43  Consumers who 
entered into subprime mortgages were unable to make their 
payments, and they defaulted at an overwhelming pace.44
B. TILA as an Escape Valve 
 
Congress enacted TILA in large part to enable consumers to 
make informed choices when they enter into credit contracts with 
lenders.  Prior to TILA, credit contracts were confusing 
documents with unclear terms that very few consumers truly 
understood.45  Congress created TILA to allow consumers to 
make informed choices when shopping for credit;46
 
40 See Maman, supra note 14, at 203 (noting that subprime mortgages “generally 
result[ ] in higher costs of credit for subprime borrowers in terms of rates and fees 
and loan terms”). 
 it requires 
that lenders make a great deal of information about a credit 
transaction available to the consumer and to do business in a 
41 See Stolly, supra note 13, at 291. 
42 Maman, supra note 14, at 195. 
43 See Macey et al., supra note 14, at 802–03. 
44 See Maman, supra note 14, at 195 (noting that since the housing bubble burst 
in 2006–2007, “subprime . . . mortgage delinquencies have reached unprecedented 
levels and mortgage foreclosures are now at an all time high”); see also Vikas Bajaj, 
Builders and Homeowners Under Strain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2008, at 1 (“The 
Mortgage Bankers Association reported . . . that loans past due or in foreclosure 
jumped to 7.9 percent . . . from 7.3 percent at the end of September [2007] and 6.1 
percent from December 2006.”). 
45 See Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer 
Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 875–
76 (2003). 
46 See Daniel Rothstein, Comment, Truth in Lending: The Right To Rescind and 
the Statute of Limitations, 14 PACE L. REV. 633, 635 (1994) (remarking that TILA 
was meant to be “an information protection device aimed at allowing informed credit 
shopping”). 
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transparent way.47  Under TILA, lenders are required to disclose 
the terms of credit contracts “in a clear and uniform manner.”48  
One way TILA protects consumers is by giving them substantial 
leverage over lenders and by creating mechanisms to make 
consumers whole should they be taken advantage of by 
unscrupulous or predatory lenders.49
TILA provides an important safety valve by giving 
consumers the right to rescind a credit transaction within three 
business days where the consumer’s home is used as a security 
interest.
 
50  During these three days, the consumer is free to 
rescind the mortgage for any reason or no reason at all.51  If, 
however, the lender has failed to make material disclosures to 
the consumer at the outset of the transaction, the consumer’s 
right to rescind may be extended to three years.52
the annual percentage rate, the method of determining the 
finance charge and the balance upon which a finance charge 
will be imposed, the amount of the finance charge, the amount 
  Information 
that is regarded as material includes 
 
47 See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure 
a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare 
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use 
of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing 
and credit card practices.”). 
48 See Peterson, supra note 45, at 876–77. 
49 See Williams v. Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(“Though one goal of the statutory rescission process is to place the consumer in a 
much stronger b argaining position, another goal of § 1635(b) is to return the parties 
most nearly to the position they held prior to entering into the transaction.”). 
50 See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (“[I]n the case of any consumer credit 
transaction . . . in which a security interest . . . is or will be retained or acquired in 
any property which is used as the principal dwelling of the person to whom credit is 
extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight 
of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the 
delivery of the information and rescission forms required under this section together 
with a statement containing the material disclosures required under this 
subchapter, whichever is later, by notifying the creditor . . . of his intention to do 
so.”). 
51 See TJAGSA Practice Notes: Legal Assistance Items, ARMY LAW., Mar. 1990, 
at 44 (“At this stage, a consumer need not have or provide a reason for the rescission; 
the right to rescind during the first three days is unlimited.”). This three-day period 
is often referred to as the consumer’s “cooling-off period.” See Rothstein, supra note 
46, at 633. 
52 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2010) (“If the required notice or material 
disclosures are not delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after 
consummation, upon transfer of all of the consumer’s interest in the property, or 
upon sale of the property, whichever occurs first.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). 
CP_Ayer (Do Not Delete)  7/14/2011  4:10 PM 
270 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:261   
to be financed, the total of payments, the number and amount of 
payments, the due dates or periods of payments scheduled to 
repay the indebtedness, and the disclosures required by section 
1639(a) of [TILA].53
The lender can use model forms provided by Regulation Z to 
inform the borrower of his rights in a simple and easily 
understandable manner.
 
54
Along with the other required TILA disclosures, the lender 
must also provide the consumer with notice of his right to 
rescind.
 
55  The notice of the right to rescind must “clearly and 
conspicuously disclose”56 several pieces of information, including 
“[t]he date the rescission period expires.”57  This “clear and 
conspicuous” standard means that “[i]f the notice is subject to 
two or more sensible readings that produce different results, then 
the creditor has not given a clear disclosure” and the consumer is 
entitled to the extended three-year rescission period.58  
Additionally, a consumer can exercise his right to rescind if the 
lender failed to use a statutorily appropriate form for the notice 
of the right to rescind or did not comply with other statutory 
notice requirements.59
 
53 15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(u) (West 2011); see also id. § 1639(a)–(b) (requiring the 
lender to make specific disclosures regarding the consumer’s completion of the 
agreement; the consequences of making the loan and the annual percentage rate; 
and laying out guidelines for the time in which the lender must make disclosures to 
the consumer); 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (2006) (providing that a lender who “willfully and 
knowingly” fails to make the required disclosures “shall be fined not more than 
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both”). 
 
54 See 12 C.F.R. § 226 app. H; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1604(b) (providing “model 
disclosure forms” as a means to encourage lenders to comply with the material 
disclosures requirement as well as to help the consumer to “understand[ ] the 
transaction by utilizing readily understandable language to simplify the technical 
nature of the disclosures”). 
55 See Elwin Griffith, The Truth and Nothing But the Truth: Confronting the 
Challenge in the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 345, 370 
(2003). 
56 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b)(1). 
57 See id. § 226.23(b)(1)(v); see also Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 701–02 (9th Cir. 1986) (“If the lending institution omits the 
expiration date and fails to cure the omission by subsequently providing the 
information, the borrower may rescind the loan within three years after it was 
consummated.”). 
58 Griffith, supra note 55, at 377. 
59 See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(i)(1) (“[A]fter the initiation of any judicial or nonjudicial 
foreclosure process on the primary dwelling of an obligor securing an extension of 
credit, the obligor shall have a right to rescind the transaction . . . if . . . the form of 
notice of rescission for the transaction is not the appropriate form of written notice 
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Rescission is meant to return the parties—the consumer and 
lender—to the positions they were in before the transaction 
occurred.60  If the loan is rescinded under TILA, “the security 
interest is dissolved, the lender returns the borrower’s payments, 
and the borrower returns the loan proceeds, less any ‘finance or 
other charge.’ ”61  Under this sequence of events, the lender “is 
supposed to return the consumer’s property and terminate the 
security interest once the consumer notifies him of rescission” 
and before the consumer has returned any money or property to 
the lender.62  The problem with this exchange from a lender’s 
perspective is that it generally favors consumers far more 
heavily, especially when the consumer invokes his or her right to 
rescind as a defense to a lender’s foreclosure action in response to 
the consumer’s mortgage default.63  A consumer who is allowed to 
rescind a loan several years after the transaction has to give back 
whatever money he or she received from the lender, but the 
lender has to give back everything the consumer paid over that 
same time period—generally leading to the lender losing out on 
the interest it was supposed to be collecting on that loan.64
II. DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
  The 
consumer is put back in the position he or she was in before the 
transaction, but the lender essentially has to take a loss. 
The traditional approach to technical violations of TILA has 
been to apply a type of strict liability standard.  Over the years, 
circuit courts have held that technical violations of TILA, such as 
failing to include the expiration date of the rescission period, 
entitle the borrower to an extended three-year rescission 
period.65
 
published and adopted by the Board or a comparable written notice, and otherwise 
complied with all the requirements of this section regarding notice.”). 
  Recently, however, the First Circuit departed from 
60 See Griffith, supra note 55 (“The result of a consumer’s rescission is that the 
parties return to the status quo ante, and the consumer is not responsible for any 
costs or charges associated with the loan.”). 
61 Semar, 791 F.2d at 702. 
62 Elwin J. Griffith, Truth in Lending—Rescission, Consumer Remedies and 
Creditor Defenses in Closed-End Transactions, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 491, 508–09 
(1988). 
63 See Rothstein, supra note 46, at 637. 
64 See id. at 657 (“The essential effect of the remedy is to afford the consumer an 
interest-free loan from the date of the transaction to the exchange of money after 
rescission.”). 
65 See infra Part II.A. 
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tradition and instead chose to apply a reasonable person 
standard.  Under this standard, the borrower is not entitled to an 
automatic extension of his rescission period based on a technical 
violation of TILA.  Rather, whether he receives the extended 
period depends on the borrower’s ability as an average, 
reasonable person to understand when his rescission period 
expired, regardless of the lender’s failure to include that date in 
the notice.66
A. Traditional Approach: Technical TILA Violation Merits 
Extended Rescission Period 
 
For almost three decades, circuit courts have consistently 
ruled that a lender’s failure to include the expiration of the three-
day rescission period in the notice of the right to rescind was a 
technical violation of TILA, entitling the consumer to the 
extended three-year rescission period.67  In 1983, the Fifth 
Circuit ruled in Williamson v. Lafferty that the lender’s failure to 
provide the expiration date of the three-day rescission period in a 
consumer’s notice of the right to rescind was an automatic 
violation of TILA entitling the consumer to retain her right to 
rescind for three years.68  In Williamson, the Plaintiff consumer 
had signed all of the documents, including a notice of the right to 
rescind, necessary to create a deed of trust to her property in 
order to finance some improvements on her home.69  The notice 
included a space for the lender to fill in the expiration date of the 
three-day rescission period, but the lender failed to provide that 
date.70
Although the lender argued that the consumer could have 
calculated when the rescission period expired because the date of 
the transaction was on the paperwork, the Fifth Circuit rejected 
this reasoning, stating, “the precise purpose of requiring the 
creditor to fill in the date is to prevent the customer from having 
 
 
66 See infra Part II.B. 
67 See Griffith, supra note 62, at 504–05 (noting that in two cases it was 
appropriate for the courts to extend the consumers’ rescission periods because “the 
omission of the expiration date on the notice was really a technical violation 
but . . . the [consumer] had a right to rely on that mandatory requirement in the 
Regulation”). 
68 See Williamson v. Lafferty, 698 F.2d 767, 768–69 (5th Cir. 1983). 
69 Id. at 768. 
70 Id. 
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to calculate three business days.”71  This approach has been 
commended as “sensible . . . because the disclosure of a specific 
date would forestall any disagreement about the end of the 
rescission period.”72
That same year, the Fourth Circuit made a similar ruling in 
Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., reversing the 
judgment of the district court that had ruled that technical TILA 
violations that did not cause the Plaintiff any actual injury did 
not give rise to creditor liability.
 
73  The Plaintiff consumer in that 
case argued that a number of technical TILA violations in the 
disclosure form, such as minor variations in terminology and an 
instance of the wrong font size, should give rise to liability on the 
part of the lender.74  The district court rejected this argument, 
reasoning that the minor violations “could not have influenced 
[the consumer’s] choice of credit” and thus, the purpose of TILA 
was still met.75
The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that even though 
Plaintiff had not sustained any actual injury from the minor 
TILA violations, because the purpose of TILA is to protect 
consumers, lenders must comply strictly with TILA regulations.
   
76  
Therefore, the lender’s failure to adhere to those regulations gave 
rise to liability and the consumer was entitled to statutory 
damages, the cost of bringing the action, and reasonable attorney 
fees.77
Three years later, in Semar v. Platte Valley Federal Savings 
& Loan Ass’n, the Ninth Circuit faced a similar question when 
Plaintiff homeowners argued that they were entitled to a three-
year rescission period due to the lender’s failure to provide the 
expiration date of the rescission period in the notice of the right 
to rescind.
 
78
 
71 Id. at 769 n.3. A “business day” is defined as “[a] day that most institutions 
open for business, usu. a day on which banks and major stock exchanges are open, 
excluding Saturdays and Sundays.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 454 (9th ed. 2009). 
  The consumers had taken out a fifteen-year, 
72 Griffith, supra note 62, at 505. 
73 713 F.2d 65, 66 (4th Cir. 1983). 
74 See id. 
75 Id. at 67. 
76 See id. (“To insure that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned, 
requires that the provisions of the Act and the regulations implementing it be 
absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.”). 
77 See id. 
78 791 F.2d 699, 701–02 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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$134,000 loan with a 16.875% annual interest rate.79  After 
making thirteen payments totaling $26,655.33, the consumers 
defaulted.80  The lender began foreclosure proceedings upon 
default, and the consumers defensively brought an action to 
rescind.81
Part of the consumers’ argument was that the lender had 
omitted the expiration date of the rescission period, although it 
did state in the paper work that “the rescission right expired 
three business days after July 16.”
   
82  They argued that, like the 
consumer in Williamson, the technical TILA violation entitled 
them to an extended three-year rescission period.83
The Ninth Circuit agreed and affirmed the district court’s 
ruling that the technical TILA violation entitled the Plaintiffs to 
the three-year extension of their rescission rights.  The court 
reasoned that “[t]echnical or minor violations of TILA . . . as well 
as major violations, impose liability on the creditor and entitle 
the borrower to rescind.”
 
84  In fact, the court went so far as to say 
that it need not even reach the other prong of the consumers’ 
argument for rescission; a simple technical violation in this case 
was dispositive.85
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit disapproved of the lender’s 
argument that the court ought to exercise its equitable discretion 
based on how sympathetic or unsympathetic the particular 
consumer is or how much protection any given consumer 
warranted.
 
86  In rejecting that argument, the court reasoned that 
deciding cases based on how sympathetic the plaintiff is, or 
appears to be, “would frustrate the very purpose of TILA.  
Congress did not intend for TILA to apply only to sympathetic 
consumers; Congress designed the law to apply to all consumers, 
who are inherently at a disadvantage in loan and credit 
transactions.”87
 
79 Id. at 701 n.2. 
  Consequently, the court endorsed the district 
80 Id. at 702. 
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 704–05. 
84 Id. at 704. 
85 See id. at 703. 
86 See id. at 704 (defendant lender argued that its case should be distinguished 
from the earlier Williamson v. Lafferty because plaintiff in that case was more 
sympathetic and in need of protection than plaintiff in the case at hand). 
87 Id. at 705. 
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court’s finding that, although the consumers in this case were 
“unsympathetic plaintiffs,” they were nevertheless entitled to 
rescission based on the technical TILA violation.88  Moreover, the 
court noted that “case law was contrary to [the lender’s] assertion 
that courts should assert equitable powers in cases with 
unsympathetic facts.”89
B. The First Circuit’s New “Reasonable Person” Approach 
 
Recently, however, in Melfi v. WMC Mortgage Corp.,90 the 
First Circuit departed from this well-established principle of 
extending the rescission period for technical TILA violations.  In 
Melfi, a homeowner who refinanced his home mortgage 
attempted to rescind the transaction twenty months after 
consummation of the loan, arguing that he was entitled to a 
three-year rescission period because the blanks for the date of 
the transaction91 and the deadline of the three-day right to 
rescind were left blank92
When the consumer brought his case in the district court, he 
relied on Semar and Williamson in arguing for an extended 
rescission period.
 . 
93  The district court pointed out, however, that 
in Santos Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp.,94 the First Circuit 
had already rejected the strict liability test that those two  
cases promulgated by announcing, “we do not require perfect 
disclosure.  The question before us is . . . only whether the 
notification [the consumer] actually received met the 
requirements of the clear and conspicuous standard laid out in 
Regulation Z.”95
 
88 Id. at 704. 
  The court in Santos-Rodriguez concluded that it 
was required to evaluate the lender’s disclosure “from the 
89 Id. 
90 568 F.3d 309 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1058 (2010). 
91 Id. at 310 (noting that although the blank was not filled in, the date of the 
transaction was “stamped on the top right corner of the notice”). 
92 Id. 
93 Melfi v. WMC Mortg. Corp., No. 08-024ML, 2009 WL 64338, at *2 (D.R.I. 
2009). 
94 Santos-Rodriguez v. Doral Mortg. Corp., 485 F.3d 12, 13–14 (1st Cir. 2007). 
This case involved two sets of consumers who each defaulted on the original home 
loan they obtained from defendant buyer, elected to refinance with the same lender 
to avoid foreclosure. Id. Two years after consummation of the refinancing loans 
attempted to rescind, claiming that they had three years to do so on the basis of the 
lender’s “alleged failure to disclose properly their rescission rights.” Id. 
95 Id. at 18; see also Melfi, 2009 WL 64338, at *2. 
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vantage point of the hypothetical average consumer”96 and that 
from that perspective, extension of the rescission period was 
inappropriate.97  Based on this precedent, the district court in 
Melfi determined that the lender’s notice was sufficient and that 
the consumer therefore was not entitled to the extended 
rescission period.98
In affirming the district court’s denial of extension of the 
rescission period, the First Circuit again departed from the 
previous circuits’ rulings that a technical TILA violation 
warranted extension of the rescission period, claiming that the 
previous circuits’ decisions were outdated.
   
99  It noted with 
disapprobation that the consumer’s argument for extension of the 
rescission period was dependent on the principle “that any flaw 
or deviation should be penalized automatically in order to deter 
such errors in the future.”100  The court went on to reject the 
argument that Congress intended for technical violations to lead 
to extension of the rescission period in order to protect the 
consumer,101 instead contending that Congress had amended 
TILA specifically to combat the problem of “widespread rescission 
for minor violations.”102
 
  The First Circuit therefore declared that  
 
 
96 Santos-Rodriguez, 485 F.3d at 18. 
97 See id. (concluding that “because plaintiffs were told, clearly and 
conspicuously, that rescission would only operate as to their pending refinance 
transaction, any conclusions that they might have drawn from that disclosure about 
their previously existing mortgages were unreasonable (and, thus, not a valid basis 
for any TILA claim)”). 
98 See Melfi v. WMC Mort. Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 311–13 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1058 (2010). 
99 See id. at 312 (arguing that “the circuit cases are now elderly and may be in 
tension with later TILA amendments”). 
100 Id. at 313. 
101 See id. (“[T]here is no evidence in TILA or any Board regulation that either 
Congress or the Board intended to render the form a nullity because of an 
uncompleted blank in the form or similar flaw where, as here, it could not possibly 
have caused [the consumer] to think that he had months in order to rescind.”). 
102 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1635(h) (2006) (“An obligor shall have no rescission 
rights arising solely from the form of written notice used by the creditor to inform 
the obligor of the rights of the obligor under this section, if the creditor provided the 
obligor the appropriate form of written notice published and adopted by the Board, 
or a comparable written notice of the rights of the obligor, that was properly 
completed by the creditor, and otherwise complied with all other requirements of 
this section regarding notice.”). 
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technical deficiencies do not matter if the borrower receives a 
notice that effectively gives him notice as to the final date for 
rescission and has the three full days to act.  Our test is 
whether any reasonable person, in reading the form provided in 
this case, would so understand it.103
The court seemed to base its ruling on the suspicion of 
consumer wrongdoing, claiming that “[t]he incentives for a 
borrower to [attempt to have a mortgage transaction rescinded 
well after the three-day cooling-off period has expired] may be 
substantial where a new loan is available, especially if rates have 
fallen or substantial interest has been paid during the period of 
the original loan.”
 
104  The First Circuit concluded that allowing a 
“reasonable borrower [who could not] have been misled” to take 
advantage of the lender’s minor omission and rescind his loan 
after almost two years would be to grant that borrower a 
windfall.105  Because the court saw this outcome as 
fundamentally unfair and inconsistent with TILA’s purpose, the 
First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the three-year 
extension, preventing the consumer from rescinding his loan.106
III. CREATING A NEW STANDARD: TRANSFORMING STRICT 
LIABILITY INTO A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION 
 
Although the First Circuit’s concerns about the strict 
liability test previously employed by the circuit courts in these 
Truth in Lending Act cases were valid, in applying a reasonable 
person test instead, the First Circuit failed to uphold the 
purposes of TILA: to protect consumers and provide incentive to 
lenders to be clear and honest in their dealings with consumers.  
If courts were to presume that borrowers did not know when 
their rescission periods ended due to the lenders’ failures to 
include the ending dates but to allow the lenders to rebut that 
presumption through evidence of the contents of the notice or the 
sophistication of a particular borrower, for example, they would 
dispel the uneasiness of the First Circuit with the strict liability 
test but also uphold the goals of TILA. 
 
 
103 Melfi, 568 F.3d at 312. 
104 Id. at 310. 
105 Id. at 313. 
106 See id.  
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The First Circuit was addressing a very real problem in its 
move from the traditional strict liability standard to a new 
reasonable person test.  It recognized that in some cases, 
consumers did know when their rescission period expired and 
that those consumers may be trying to take advantage of a 
loophole years later to rid themselves of disadvantageous 
mortgages.107  The strict liability approach grants the extended 
rescission period for any technical TILA violation108
The purpose of TILA is to protect consumers and allow them 
to make informed credit choices.  The senators who supported 
creating TILA were mainly concerned with “the costs of credit to 
the borrower,” specifically the details of the finance charge 
associated with a particular transaction.
 and thus 
does not distinguish between borrowers who did not understand 
their rescission forms and borrowers who clearly understood 
when the three-day rescission period expired in spite of the 
lender’s failure explicitly to provide that date.  Moreover, the 
strict liability approach goes beyond Congress’s purpose in 
creating TILA by establishing lender liability over what is, in the 
grand scheme of things, a relatively minor omission.  
109  When Congress was 
formulating TILA, however, they were concerned mainly with 
fraud and very serious abuses by lenders.  Congress’s intent was 
to protect borrowers from “fraudulent, deceitful, or grossly 
misleading information, advertising, labeling, or other 
practices.”110  The ultimate motivation behind the creation of 
TILA was the belief that borrowers were “entitled to know the 
truth about credit rates and charges.”111
 
107 See id. at 312 The court explained that the consumer must have known when 
the three-day rescission period expired because the consumer was given all of the 
appropriate forms on the closing date of the loan, that date was stamped on the 
paperwork, and “it is easy enough to count three days.” Id. Thus, no reasonable 
consumer could have been misled by the omission of the expiration date. Id. 
  To punish lenders for 
failing to include the expiration date of the rescission period in  
 
 
 
108 See Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 704 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (“Technical or minor violations of TILA or Reg Z, as well as major 
violations, impose liability on the creditor and entitle the borrower to rescind.”). 
109 109 CONG. REC. 2027 (1963). 
110 Id. at 2029. 
111 Id.  
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the transaction paperwork would be to go beyond Congress’s 
intent in creating TILA, which was to protect borrowers against 
much more serious fraud.112
The First Circuit was cognizant of the fact that there are 
sophisticated consumers who enter into mortgage agreements 
fully able to understand the rescission notice, and they should 
not be allowed to use a minor infraction on the part of the lender 
to rescind a loan after the three business days are up.
 
113  The 
First Circuit is correct that we should be hesitant to allow any 
and all consumers to take advantage of an extended rescission 
period for such a small error and that there are some situations 
where the consumer who invokes TILA simply does not need its 
protection.114
Nevertheless, the reasonable person test promulgated by the 
First Circuit as a solution to this problem will create an unfair 
result when applied to cases where a consumer is seeking to 
rescind a subprime mortgage.  The essence of this problem 
springs from the basic predatory lending practices that, in many 
cases, have overlapped with subprime lending over the past few 
years.
 
115
 
112 See id. at 2028 (“Our objective is merely to strip away the disguises which 
frequently hide or distort the true price of credit.”).  
  Lenders targeted potential borrowers that they thought 
they could convince to take on a subprime loan—people who were 
relatively unsophisticated and uneducated, who were unlikely to 
read and understand the paperwork accompanying the  
 
 
113 See Melfi v. WMC Mortg. Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 310 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1058 (2010). The court’s statement that there may be significant 
incentives for a borrower to attempt to rescind a loan transaction when certain 
conditions exist is a strong indication that this is what the court had in mind when it 
made this ruling. In essence, the court does not want to allow a borrower who 
understood that he only had three days to rescind his transaction to use the lender’s 
minor mistake as a loophole to attempt to get out of the transaction at a much later 
date and for some other reason. 
114 For an example of this type of situation, see Burke v. Yingling, 666 A.2d 288, 
290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (finding that a consumer was not entitled to the protection 
of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”) because he 
was a sophisticated consumer who had initiated the transaction and had negotiated 
the terms of the contract himself and thus, fell outside of the purview of the 
UTPCPL). 
115 See Maman, supra note 14, at 204 (noting that “the characteristics of 
subprime mortgage lending, with its borrowers’ demographics and higher rates and 
fees, makes it fertile ground for lending abuse where predatory lending is 
unfortunately prevalent”). 
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transaction, and who would not understand enough about 
subprime loans to realize that they simply could not afford to 
take on that kind of financial risk.116
When analyzed in that context, the First Circuit’s approach 
creates two problems.  First, it fails to take into account the 
realities of the subprime mortgage market and the underlying 
predatory lending that occurred in that market.  Most 
significantly, it applies a reasonable person standard to 
consumers that predatory lenders expected not to be reasonable.  
Given the nature of predatory lending, it is no longer appropriate 
to “evaluate the adequacy of TILA disclosures from the vantage 
point of a hypothetical average consumer . . . who is neither 
particularly sophisticated nor particularly dense.”
   
117  Predatory 
lenders were not targeting “average consumers” or “any 
reasonable person.”118  They targeted consumers that they 
thought they could coerce into taking on subprime loans so that 
the lender, and individual mortgage brokers, could make more 
money.119  It is unfair to impose a reasonable person standard on 
consumers who are trying to rescind their subprime loans when 
so often they entered into those loans because they were targeted 
and victimized by predatory lenders because of some perceived 
disadvantage or vulnerability.  Thus, the reasonable person test 
fails to uphold to the primary tenet of TILA: to protect vulnerable 
consumers.120
Second, the reasonable person test imposes a burden on the 
consumer that TILA does not contemplate.  The purpose of TILA 
was to impose a burden on the lender to provide adequate 
  It leaves members of those communities who are 
exploited by predatory lenders with one less remedy to protect 
themselves. 
 
116 See Stolly, supra note 13, at 294–95 (explaining that subprime lending 
crosses over into predatory lending when lenders purposefully and systematically 
target vulnerable consumers in communities that were traditionally disadvantaged 
when it came to obtaining credit). 
117 Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2006). 
118 See, e.g., Stolly, supra note 13, at 296 (explaining that oftentimes predatory 
lenders target the elderly because they “may lack an adequate understanding of the 
complexities of financial transactions . . . or understand their credit-worthiness” and 
because “they may never have been involved with financial affairs”). 
119 See supra text accompanying notes 29–31. 
120 See Peterson, supra note 45, at 884 (“Disclosure regulations provide 
consumers with an important opportunity to protect themselves from credit bargains 
that are not truly in their own best interests.”). 
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disclosures to consumers.121  The reasonable person test, 
however, imposes a burden on the consumer to determine based 
on the face of the rescission notice the date when the rescission 
period expires if the lender has not followed his statutory duty to 
include that date in the notice.122
A test is needed, therefore, that will address the specific 
problem of predatory lending in the subprime market and that 
also will ensure that the burden remains on the lender rather 
than imposing a new one on the consumer.  A more fair 
methodology would be to create a rebuttable presumption that, 
absent the lender’s insertion of the expiration date of the 
rescission period, the borrower was unaware of when that 
expiration date would occur and therefore is entitled to the three-
year rescission period.  The lender assumes the burden of proof to 
rebut this presumption by proving that the borrower did 
understand when the rescission period expired.  In marshalling 
its argument, the lender may rely on a number of factors, 
including but not limited to: whether the date the transaction 
was consummated was included conspicuously elsewhere in the 
rescission notice, if the borrower was notified in some other 
way—perhaps in person or over the phone—about when the 
rescission period would expire, and the borrower’s sophistication 
and ability to understand the rescission notice.
  If the First Circuit’s 
hypothetical “reasonable person” could have determined from the 
face of that notice when the three-day rescission period expired, 
then the consumer is out of luck and cannot rescind the 
transaction on the basis of the lender’s failure to include the 
expiration date of the rescission period. 
123
 
121 See supra text accompanying notes 35–38. 
  Essentially, 
the lender will have the burden of proving that all of its actions 
were, although careless, not intentionally deceptive and that the 
borrower was able to ascertain the expiration date despite the 
lender’s omission. 
122 Melfi v. WMC Mortg. Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 312 (1st Cir. 2009) (stating that 
“technical deficiencies do not matter if the borrower receives a notice that effectively 
gives him notice as to the final date for rescission”), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1058 
(2010). 
123 For an argument that the borrower’s ability to understand the notice should 
not be a consideration, see Palmer v. Champion Mortgage, 465 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 
2006) (announcing that in TILA cases, courts have “focused the lens of [their 
inquiries] on the text of the disclosures themselves rather than on plaintiffs’ 
descriptions of their subjective understandings”). 
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Another benefit of the rebuttable presumption is that, like 
the strict liability test, it provides an incentive for the lender to 
make sure to include the expiration date of the rescission period 
in the notice of the borrower’s right to rescind.  It costs the lender 
essentially nothing to calculate the three days and ensure that 
the date is included where it is supposed to be in the paperwork.  
On the other hand, if the lender fails to do this, it will be forced 
to go to court to explain why that failure should not entitle the 
borrower to the extended rescission period.  This will entail 
extensive discovery—in many cases discovery of personal 
information about the borrower that is in the borrower’s 
particular control.  When weighing the cost of such a proceeding 
against the cost of simply stamping the expiration date in the 
rescission notice, it is clear that paying attention to detail will 
result in the lender potentially saving a great deal of money. 
Most importantly, the rebuttable presumption will result in 
a much more fair result, both for borrowers and lenders.  For 
example, in Williamson v. Lafferty, the borrower, Eloise 
Williamson, was “a divorced 43-year-old mother of seven 
children, three of whom she still support[ed] with her earnings as 
a cook.”124  Ms. Williamson owned a home and had a mortgage.125  
A representative of the lender contacted Ms. Williamson and 
solicited from her a contract to add a garage on to her home and 
to put an addition on her home.126  Ms. Williamson signed the 
contract, and as part of the transaction, she executed a deed of 
trust security interest in her home.127
In applying the rebuttable presumption methodology, when 
this case came before the court, the court would assume that 
because the lender failed to include the expiration date, Ms. 
Williamson did not know when her rescission period ended and 
that therefore she would be entitled to the longer rescission 
period.  The lender, however, would have the option of 
attempting to rebut this presumption by arguing that Ms. 
Williamson did know when the rescission period ended, despite 
its failure to include that date in the paperwork.  The lender’s 
primary argument would be that the date of the transaction was 
included elsewhere in the paperwork, so it would have been 
 
 
124 Williamson v. Lafferty, 698 F.2d 767, 768 (5th Cir. 1983). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
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simple for Ms. Williamson to read the rescission provision and 
calculate for herself when her three-day rescission period 
expired.128  The lender’s argument would likely not be strong 
enough to rebut the presumption against it, however, because 
even though the date of the transaction was included elsewhere 
in the paperwork, Ms. Williamson seems to have been a 
relatively unsophisticated consumer who was not likely to have 
read the paperwork accompanying the transaction.  Moreover, 
the lender did not even complete one of the forms, the deed of 
trust to Ms. Williamson’s property, until after Ms. Williamson 
had signed the document.129  This demonstrates a general lack of 
honesty and transparency by the lender and thus resembles the 
fraudulent and deceitful practices with which Congress was 
concerned when it began drafting TILA.130
In Melfi, discussed above,
   
131
You have a legal right under federal law to cancel this 
transaction, without cost, within THREE BUSINESS DAYS 
from whichever of the following events occurs LAST: (1) The 
date of the transaction, which is __________; or (2) The date you 
receive your Truth in Lending Act disclosures; or (3) The date 
you received this notice of your right to cancel.
 however, the lender would most 
likely have a much better chance at rebutting the presumption 
against it.  In that case, the notice of rescission that Mr. Melfi 
received from the lender was very clear.  It explained:  
132
The lender could argue that even though the blank for the 
date of the transaction was not filled in, the form did have the 
date of the transaction stamped at the top of the notice.
   
133
The lender in Semar would have the strongest argument, 
however, because in that case, although the lender had failed to 
include the actual expiration date of the rescission period, the 
notice very clearly indicated that the rescission right would 
  The 
lender could also argue that because the date of the transaction 
was included conspicuously on the notice, Mr. Melfi needed only 
to turn to the rescission provision for guidance on how to 
calculate the three days based on that date. 
 
128 See id. at 769 n.3. 
129 Id. at 768. 
130 See supra text accompanying notes 106–07. 
131 See supra notes 91–105 and accompanying text. 
132 Melfi v. WMC Mortg. Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 311 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 1058 (2010). 
133 See id. 
CP_Ayer (Do Not Delete)  7/14/2011  4:10 PM 
284 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:261   
expire three business days after July 16.134
CONCLUSION 
  Thus, to rebut the 
presumption in favor of the borrower, the lender could argue that 
the expiration date of the rescission period was constructively 
included in the notice, even if the expiration date itself was not 
exactly where it was supposed to be or stated as explicitly as it 
should have been. 
As a result of the collapse of the housing market, fueled by 
the proliferation of subprime mortgages and predatory lending 
practices, foreclosure proceedings have risen dramatically, and 
consumers are looking for any and all defenses to those 
proceedings, including using the lender’s technical TILA 
violations essentially as loopholes.  Our society has an interest in 
protecting its members who were victimized by predatory 
lenders, while at the same time not rewarding those consumers 
who understood their rescission notices and are using the 
lender’s oversight as a loophole to get out of transactions that are 
no longer favorable, as the First Circuit recognized.  Rejecting 
the First Circuit’s reasonable person test in favor of a rebuttable 
presumption to determine whether a consumer should be granted 
an extended rescission period fulfills the goal of protecting those 
who need protection while preventing others from taking 
advantage of a minor technical defect at the expense of lenders.  
As a result, courts will strike a balance between upholding the 
goals of TILA—protecting consumers and forcing lenders to be 
forthright in their dealings—and basic fairness in preventing 
borrowers from using a loophole to get out a bad mortgage by 
taking advantage of a lender’s minor mistake. 
 
134 See Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 702 (9th 
Cir. 1986). 
